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This paper investigates the determinants of the corporate debt maturity structure of 
Czech firms. The theoretical section provides an overview of contemporary theories 
on corporate debt maturity structure. The regression section describes an 
econometric model showing that the long-term debt increases with Firm size, 
Leverage and Asset maturity. The impact of Growth options, Collateralizable assets, 
Firm tax rate, and Firm level volatility has been found out as statistically 
insignificant. The portfolio analyses section of this paper shows the bank-based 
system pattern of financing of Czech firms, increasing importance of intra-group 
financing and increasing presence of Maturity matching principle. Finally, the paper 
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1.  Introduction  
If we consider the decision making in corporate financing, we can observe two main areas of 
interest. Besides the debt versus equity decision making (where we can find extensive 
research in the area of capital structure) there is also the factor of debt maturity which is of the 
same importance; but which usually is not in a focus of financial research. Surprisingly there 
is rather little empirical evidence on determinants of the corporate debt maturity structure. 
One of the early papers is Morris (1975), who was focused on U.S. firms. Also the other 
authors cover mainly U.S. firms (Mitchell, 1993; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001; Stohs and Mauer, 
1996; Barclay and Smith; 1995) or U.K. firms (Ooi, 1999; Ozkan, 2002; Ozkan, 2000) and 
there is also only a limited list of papers focused on cross-country comparison; see Antoniou 
et al. (2003) and Fan et al. (2003). We can also see that empirical evidence is more available 
in case of market-based financial systems and more limited in case of bank-based financial 
systems (see cross-country comparison above or Cai et al.; 1999). And since there is a limited 
empirical evidence on the corporate debt maturity structure in case of advanced economies, 
there is no empirical evidence for transition countries. This paper presents the evidence for the 
Czech firms, which can be seen as a good representative of the group of transition countries. 
Do we really know how financial practitioners decide on financing tools of their firms? When 
and why do they choose bank debt, bond debt, or leasing? According to which terms do they 
decide on the maturity of these debts? And are the firms really the decision makers on the 
financing tools, or are they only decision takers forced by the external factors (bank-based and 
market-based conditions, debtholders decisions)? Despite the huge theoretical and empirical 
research, not all of the above mentioned questions can be satisfactorily answered. This paper 
aims to improve our knowledge on decision making in corporate financing particularly in case 
of Czech firms. Are the patterns of the corporate debt maturity structure of Czech firms 
similar to the other developed countries or can we observe some deviations that might be the 
product of past dependency on command economy? This paper tries to answer this question 
too. 
The paper aims to provide us with an additional stone for the mosaic of empirical evidence of 
Czech firms’ financing. The capital structure issues have been already investigated by Bauer 
(2004) based on the data from Visegrad countries, by Weill (2001) based on the data from 
Eastern European countries, or by Palata (2004) focusing on data from Čekia (similar to ours, 
see below). Kočenda and Lízal (2003) provided empirical analyses of financial distress of the 
1 Czech firms. Dvořák (2004) delivered an opinion survey with Czech CFO
1 on the issues of 
decision making in financing. This paper provides data evidence on the corporate debt 
maturity structure.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two provides an overview of theories of debt maturity 
structure, section three provides an econometric empirical analysis, section four provides an 
additional portfolio analysis, section five discusses limitations of the result, and section six 
concludes. 
2.  Theories of debt maturity structure 
Before we can build up an empirical model for the determinants of the corporate debt maturity 
structure, we need to deliver a survey of theoretical points of departure for our research. The 
literature offers several leading theories on debt maturity structure, namely Agency costs, 
Leverage, Maturity matching, Taxes, and Signaling.  
2.1.  Agency costs 
The first group of theories on the debt maturity structure regards agency costs as an important 
determinant of the debt maturity. We consider Growth options, Size, and Collateralizable 
assets as the major ones.  
Growth options 
The primal study on the growth options is Myers (1977) who argues that corporate future 
investment opportunities can be considered as options. The value of these growth options then 
depends on the probability that the firms will exercise them optimally. In case of firms the 
profits from the investments are split among the shareholders and the debtholders accordingly. 
But in some cases the debtholders may capture too high share of the profit leaving a below 
normal returns to the shareholders. This may create incentive problems for the shareholders 
since in this particular case the shareholders are keen to reject an investment with a positive 
net present value. Myers (1977) calls this situation an underinvestment problem. He further 
argues that the maturity of the debt can play an important role in solving this issue. Firms can 
issue more short-term debt which matures and can be re-contracted before the growth options 
can be exercised. “Thus it seems that permanent debt capital is best obtained by a policy of 
rolling over short-term maturity debt claims.” (Myers, 1977:159) Similarly, Barnea et al. 
(1980) also argue for shortening of the debt maturity, which can serve as a mitigation tool for 
the agency conflicts between the shareholder and the debtholders. “If the debt matures prior to 
the exercise of the investment option, the agency problem disappears.” (Barnea et al., 
1980:1233) 
Size 
It is widely accepted by the current literature that larger firms have lower agency costs of the 
debt (Ozkan, 2000; Yi, 2005; Whited, 1992), because these larger firms are believed to have 
an easier access to capital markets (they can more easily overcome the transaction costs) and a 
stronger negotiation power (they have a stronger position in the debt negotiation than smaller 
firms). Hence both these arguments favor larger firms for issuing more long-term debt 
compared to smaller firms. In addition to it Smith and Warner (1979) argue that smaller firms 
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2 are more likely to face higher agency costs in terms of a conflict of the interest between 
shareholders and debtholders. 
Collateralizable assets 
The volume of collateralizable assets (e.g. assets such as inventory or premises that can be 
pledged in favor of the creditor) in the firm’s balance sheet is also believed to have an impact 
on the debt maturity structure (Whited, 1992). Firms with higher share of collateralizable 
assets can pledge this asset in favor of the long-term debtholders. This favors these firms in 
comparison to the firms with less collateralizable assets. The firms with less collateralizable 
assets are thus believed to have less long-term debt and more short-term debt. The impact of 
the collateralizable assets is widely accepted, especially in terms of long-term debt 
discussions. Although the short-term financing is to some degree provided on bianco basis 
(with no collateral), the bianco approach for the long-term debts is very rare and the collateral 
plays a very important role.  
Based on these agency costs arguments, we will consider the impact of Growth options, Firm 
size and Collateralizable assets on the corporate debt maturity structure.  
2.2.  Leverage 
Leland and Toft (1996) theoretically show that firms with higher leverage tend to choose 
longer maturity of the debt and vice versa. “Optimal leverage depends upon debt maturity, 
and is markedly lower when the firm is financed by shorter term debt.” (Leland and Toft, 
1996: 1014) Morris (1992) also argues that firms with higher debt ratio tend to issue more 
long-term debts in order to delay their exposure to bankruptcy risk. On the other side the tax 
and agency theories predict opposite effects of the leverage on the debt maturity. Therefore 
the impact of the leverage on the debt maturity structure is an empirical puzzle.  
Based on these arguments, we will consider the impact of Leverage on corporate debt 
maturity structure.  
2.3.  Maturity matching 
Maturity matching can be considered as liquidity immunization of the balance sheet structure. 
Stohs and Maurer (1996) or Morris (1976) argue that a firm can face risk of not having 
sufficient cash in case the maturity of the debt is shorter than the maturity of the assets (the 
debt service is shorter than the asset life cycle e.g. ability to produce the cash flow) or even 
vice versa in case the maturity of the debt is longer than the maturity of assets (the cash flow 
from assets necessary for the debt repayment terminates). Following these arguments, the 
maturity matching principle belongs to the determinants of the corporate debt maturity 
structure.  
Additionally, Myers (1977) argues that maturity matching of firm assets and liabilities can 
also partially serve as a tool for mitigation of the underinvestment problem, which was 
discussed in the agency costs theory section. Here the maturity matching principle ensures 
that the debt repayments shall be due according to the decline of the asset value. “… we can 
interpret matching maturities as an attempt to schedule debt repayments to correspond to the 
decline in future value of assets currently in place.” (Myers, 1977:171) 
Gapenski (1999) differentiates two strategies of maturity matching namely the accounting and 
financing approach. The accounting approach considers the assets as current and fixed ones 
and calls for the financing of the current assets by short-term liabilities, and of the fixed assets 
by long-term liabilities and equity. The financing approach considers the assets as permanent 
and temporary. In these terms the fixed assets are definitely permanent ones and some stable 
3 part of the fluctuating current assets is also taken as permanent. This approach then suggests 
financing the permanent assets by long-term funds (long-term liabilities and equity) and 
temporary assets by short-term liabilities. Consequently, the financing approach generally 
employs ceteris paribus more long-term liabilities than the accounting approach does. 
The financing approach (borrowing more on long-term basis) brings more stable interest costs 
than the accounting approach; but as the yield curve is usually upward sloped, the financing 
approach is also more costly. The financing approach versus accounting approach decision-
making is thus a classical risk return trade-off relationship. In praxis, the corporates 
commonly favor the accounting approach before the finance approach, the same holds for our 
consideration of maturity matching for the empirical evidence of the debt maturity structure. 
Based on these Maturity matching arguments, we will consider the impact of balance sheet 
liquidity immunization on the corporate debt maturity structure.  
2.4.  Taxes 
Kane et al. (1984) introduced a model that incorporated endogenous determinants of the 
optimum corporate debt maturity: corporate and personal taxes, bankruptcy costs and flotation 
costs (transaction costs of external financing). Their optimum debt maturity setting involves a 
trade-off between the advantage of corporate debt tax shield and the disadvantage of 
bankruptcy and flotation costs. They found out that the optimum debt maturity increases with  
i) increasing flotation costs: “As expected, the higher the transaction costs associated with a 
debt issue, the grater is the optimal maturity of the debt, since more time is required to 
amortize the flotation costs.” Kane et al. (1984:15),  
ii) decreasing corporate debt tax shield: “In addition, a high personal tax rate is generally 
associated with higher optimal maturity. This is again due to the fact that at a lower tax 
advantage, a longer maturity is required to amortize the flotation costs incurred in issuing the 
debt. At very high personal tax rates, it becomes optimal for the firm to issue no debt because 
the tax advantage net of bankruptcy costs is never great enough to offset amortized 
transactions costs, whatever the maturity.” Kane et al. (1984:15) 
iii) decreasing volatility of the firm value “reflecting the fact that with less volatile asset 
returns, the firm rebalances its capital structure less frequently.” Kane et al. (1984:17)  
Based on these tax arguments, we will consider the impact of an effective Tax rate and Firm 
value volatility on the corporate debt maturity structure. We will omit the impact of flotation 
costs, as they are hard to be measured in our terms.  
In order to make the survey of theories on debt maturity structure as much comprehensive as 
possible we deliver also a list of debt maturity arguments whose impact has not been 
investigated in this paper.  
2.5.  Signaling  
Signaling quality 
The signaling models predict that the corporate debt maturity structure is related to the degree 
of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders (investors). It is generally accepted 
that the corporate debt maturity structure can signal information about quality of a firm. 
Flannery (1986) argues that the debt maturity can serve for more informed insiders as a 
signaling tool towards less informed outsiders. He further argues that low-quality firms (Bad 
firms in his terminology) prefer more long-term debt and high-quality firm prefer more short-
term debt. This is supported by the fact that in transaction costs environment the low-quality 
firm cannot afford to roll-over the short-term debt as they face a considerable risk of financial 
4 distress in case the debt shall not be prolonged. Flannery (1986) further argues that high-
quality firms (Good firms in his words) will issue more short-term debt than low-quality 
firms. The managers of the high-quality firms voluntarily expose the firms to the risk of the 
debt renegotiation after more information is available to the outsiders, as they expect this 
information to be positive. As a result, the high-quality firms signal their type by issuing the 
short-term debt. Consequently, the firms will wait with the debt issue if they expect that there 
will be good news; but will not wait until bad news are released.  
Due to the fact that the corporate quality showed to be very hardly proxied, we retreat from 
the investigation of the above-mentioned signaling arguments on corporate debt maturity 
structure.  
Liquidity risk or creditworthiness risk 
The liquidity risk or financial distress risk provides strong incentives for firms to borrow on 
long-term basis. Diamond (1991) argues that short-term debt allows for renegotiation of debt 
costs after good news about the firm are released, which is in line with Flannery (1986) 
above. On the other side the short-term debt represents liquidity risk for the debtor, which 
would arise if the short-term debt would not be renegotiated. Thus a typical trade-off 
relationship arises. Diamond (1991) further argues that low-quality debtors with low cash-
flows for long-term debt repayments are forced to borrow on short-term basis. Middle-quality 
debtors favor long-term financing since they face higher liquidity risk than the high-quality 
debtors. And high-quality debtors who face low liquidity risk do favor short-term borrowing. 
At the end there are two types of borrowers on short-term basis: those of high-quality and 
those of low-quality whereas firms in between of middle-quality are expected to borrow on 
long-term basis. “Debt maturity choice is analyzed as a trade-off between a borrower’s 
preference for short-term debt due to private information about the future credit rating, and 
liquidity risk.” (Diamond, 1991:709) However the predictions of the Diamond model are not 
testable in the Czech environment. We lack of necessary comprehensive data, therefore we 
retreat from the investigation of the above-mentioned creditworthiness arguments on 
corporate debt maturity structure. In addition to it we see surprisingly that the arguments on 
signaling quality and signaling creditworthiness have produced different hypotheses for very 
similar determinants. Here the theory of corporate finance is to be streamlined in the future.  
Firm age 
Scherr and Hulburt (2001) also argue that firm age can be employed as a signaling tool. In 
these terms older firms are said to signal through the age to be more stable than the younger 
firms. Therefore the older firms are expected to have larger share of long-term debt than the 
younger firms do. But again since we lack of necessary data, we retreat from the investigation 
of the above-mentioned firm age arguments on corporate debt maturity structure. 
3.  Empirical analysis 
At this time we have sufficiently evolved the theoretical arguments in order to be able to 
approach the empirical part. In this section we discuss and set the dependant variable, the 
explanatory variables and the hypotheses; then we compose the regression equation, describe 
the sample of firms, provide the descriptive statistics for the sample, deliver the regression 
results, and compare these results with other empirical analyses. 
5 3.1.  Debt maturity structure measure – dependant variable 
The debt maturity structure is usually depicted as a ratio of long-term debt to total debt. The 
long-term debt is considered either as a debt maturing over one year or as a debt maturing 
over longer period (mostly five years). In our case the ratio of debt maturing over one year to 
total debt is employed and the variable is written as follows 
Debt maturity structure = 
TD
D1 2.  (1)
There are several reasons for using this form. First, there is no data enabling differentiation of 
particular maturities of the debt and only two-fold differentiation of an up-to-one-year and 
over-one-year debt is available in the firm financials. Second, in the Czech financial system 
the creditors are not very keen to finance on longer than five years maturity basis, therefore 
the differentiation between a below-five-year debt and over-five-year debt would not be 
fruitful. And finally, the financial practitioners pay less attention to particular maturities of 
long-term debt than to short-term debt vs. long-term debt decision-making.  
3.2.  Proxies for debt maturity structure determinants 
Growth options 
Hypothesis 1:   Firms with more growth options have shorter debt maturity structure. 
Growth options can be measured in several ways. One approach compares the market value 
and book value of the assets, which can be written as 
Growth options = 
BV
MV 3.  (2)
This follows an argument that firms with positive expectations from the financial market are 
to have more growth options. Consequently the difference of the market value and the book 
value of its assets shall be higher than it is in case of a firm with negative financial market 
expectations. Naturally, this approach is not employable for Czech firms, as the market value 
is known only to a very limited set of firms (since the Czech financial system is a bank based 
one). 
The second approach considers development of fixed assets as a proxy for the growth options. 
Here investments of the firm into fixed assets are considered as a signal for the market that the 
firm is increasing its capacity and thus has positive future expectations. This can be depicted 
by either a ratio of annual depreciation to total assets (if this increases, the firm has invested 
into fixed assets) written as 
Growth options = 
TA
D 4 (3)
or by a relation of annual capital expenditures (CAPEX) to total assets which is a proxy more 
rapidly mirroring the changes of fixed assets written as 
Growth options = 
TA
CAPEX 5.  (4)
                                                           
2 Where D1 is debt maturing over 1 year and TD is total debt  
3 Where MV is market value of the firm and BV is book value of the firm. 
4 Where D is depreciation and TA is total assets 
5 Which stands for capital expenditures where CAPEX is capital expenditures and TA are total 
assets 
6 We employed both determinants separately in the computations. Their significance shall be 
discussed in the regression results paragraphs.  
Size 
Hypothesis 2:   Larger firms have longer debt maturity structure. 
The size of the firm can be measured in two ways. This can be either in terms of the volume 
of the production (revenues in fixed price level) written as 
Firm size =  R ln
6 (5)
or in terms of the volume of the property (total assets) written as 
Firm size = 
7 TA ln . (6)
As the impact of the size is expected to be lower for larger firms, usually natural logarithm of 
the proxy for the size is used. We employed both determinants separately in the computations 
and have found their very similar explanatory power. Therefore only the variable from 
equation (5) occurs in the regression results. 
Collateralizable assets 
Hypothesis 3:   Firms with more collateralizable assets have longer debt maturity 
structure.  
The collateralizable assets are those assets that can be pledged in favor of the creditor. They 
serve as a tool for mitigation of creditor’s risk exposure since they are sold in favor of the 
debtholder if the debt is defaulting. Usually intangible assets (such as goodwill or licenses) 
are not easily collateralizable whereas tangible assets (such as inventory or premises) are 
collateralizable. Therefore ratio of the tangible assets (excluding financial fixed assets) to the 
total assets written as 
Collateralizable assets = 
TA
Tan 8 (7)
usually serves as a proxy for collateralizable assets.  
But this commonly used proxy also takes current assets into account; as the tangible assets 
comprise both current tangible assets (inventory) and fixed tangible assets (premises). We do 
not fully agree with this approach, as current tangible assets can be hardly employed for the 
collateralization of the long-term loans. The merchandise is going to be sold soon and the 
material is going to be processed into finished products and again further sold. Such loan 
would become uncollateralized later on. To take this into consideration, we employ an 
adjusted proxy for the collateralizable assets written as follows 
Collateralizable assets = 
TA
TanFA 9,  (8)
which considers the tangible fixed assets as the only collateralizable asset for the long-term 
debt. 
                                                           
6 Where R are revenues 
7 Where TA are total assets 
8 Where Tan are tangible assets and TA are total assets 
9 Where TanFA are tangible fixed assets and TA are total assets 
7 Leverage 
Hypothesis 4:   Firms with higher leverage have longer debt maturity structure. 
The measure of the leverage can be twofold. First, this can be measured fully in the book 
values as a ratio of total debts to total assets  
Leverage = 
TA
TD 10 (9) 
or this can also be measured as a combination of book and market values as a ratio of total 






As the market values for the equity are available only for a very limited amount of firms in 
the Czech republic, the prior proxy is employed. 
Maturity matching 
Hypothesis 5:   Firms with longer asset maturity have longer debt maturity structure. 
The impact of maturity matching can also be measured twofold. The first measure considers 
the ratio of the long-term funded assets to the total assets  
Asset maturity = 
TA
FA 12.  (11)
The second measure interprets the assets’ maturity in terms of time  
Asset maturity = 
D
PPE 13.  (12)
The fist measure takes into consideration the whole volume of funded assets but disregards its 
true particular maturities (some assets are utilized for longer time than others). The second 
measure on the other side takes into consideration the true particular maturity of the property, 
plant and equipment, but again, it disregards the impact of other fixed assets such as the 
intangible fixed assets (licenses) or financial fixed assets (subsidiaries) which are not 
depreciated but which are also said to be funded on a long-term basis. 
We have already noted that the liquidity immunization of the balance sheet structure suggests 
funding of fixed assets on a long-term basis, e.g. by long-term liabilities and/or equity. 
Therefore the proposed determinant in equation (11), which is commonly used in papers on 
the corporate debt maturity structure (such as Heyman et al.; 2003), does not fully represent 
this claim, as it does not consider the volume of the equity in terms of fixed assets funding. 
Therefore, we employ an adjusted determinant for the impact of the maturity matching, which 
can be written as follows 
Asset maturity = 
TA
Eq FA− 14,  (13)
where only excess of the fixed assets over the equity is to be funded through the liabilities on 
a long-term basis. 
                                                           
10 Where TD is total debt and TA are total assets 
11 Where TD is total debt and MVE is market value of equity 
12 Where FA are fixed assets and TA are total assets 
13 PPE is property, plant and equipment and D is annual depreciation 
14 Where FA are fixed assets, Eq is equity and TA are total assets 
8 Taxes 
Hypothesis 6:   Firms with higher effective income tax rate have longer debt maturity 
structure. 
The effective income tax rate is usually measured as a ratio of taxes paid to the pre-tax 
income  
Firm tax rate = 
PTI
T 15.  (14)
The taxes paid include both due taxes and deferred taxes; hence the impact of the deferred 
taxes is omitted. Deferred taxes have a strong impact on this variable by making it both very 
volatile and less dependant on the previous financial year, which makes the explanatory 
power of this determinant rather weak. 
Firm level volatility 
Hypothesis 7:   Firms with less volatile asset returns have longer debt maturity 
structure. 
The general proxy for the firm value volatility is taken as the earnings volatility. Usually the 
variance of the EBITDA
16 scaled by total assets is considered an appropriate variable 








EBITDA EBITDA 17 (15)
or alternatively a variance of the EBITDA scaled by the EBITDA is also employed 








EBITDA EBITDA 18.  (16)
We employed both determinants separately in the computations and we have found their very 
similar explanatory power. Therefore only variable from equation (16) occurs in the 
regression results. 
3.3.  Regression equation 
Based on the arguments in the theories of the debt maturity structure section and in the 
proxies for the debt maturity structure determinants section, the regression equation can be 
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or can be also rewritten in the verbal form as 
                                                           
15 Where T is tax expense and PTI is pre-tax income 
16 EBITDA – earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
17 Where EBITDA is earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization, TA is total 
assets and t is time 
18 Where EBITDA is earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization, TA is total 
assets and t is time 
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where DMS is the debt maturity structure,  
where α as the intercept and βi are the unknown parameters of interest and  
where εi stands for the error term.  
The major literature on the corporate debt maturity structure uses plain OLS method for the 
regression analysis (see Comparative analysis section below). In Ooi (1999) the significance 
of these plain OLS results is at least not worse than of other methods. However in our 
computations the plain OLS model did not show as the most proper one, as the Theta measure 
computed close to zero indicated that the panel data models are to be employed. Here, Baltagi 
(2001:65) suggests the Hausman’s specification test for the decision-making mechanism 
between the fixed effects model and the random affects model. Based on this test the fixed 
effects model was indicated as the most proper one. 
3.4.  Sample of firms 
Data was kindly provided by Čekia
19. They included the financial statements (the balance 
sheet and the profit and loss account) for all the firms in the Čekia’s database for years 2000-
2004. The financial statements were provided with various detailed structures (in full wording 
or in limited wording with subtotals) for firms of differing state (active, in bankruptcy, 
liquidation, etc.) from different sectors (financial, manufacturing, services etc) for differing 
years (not all firms were covered for the whole time period). Naturally, this data set needed to 
be processed later on to enable the empirical analysis. Generally, the data processing was 
tackling two issues: the data structure (such as firms covered) and the data (in)consistency 
(such as illogical data entries).  
First, the data structure was handled and the firms from inappropriate sectors (financial 
institutions), states (bankruptcy, liquidation), and legal statuses (municipalities, private 
entrepreneurs, etc.) were omitted. Second, the data (in)consistency was handled as the data set 
included some illogical data entries, which needed to be adjusted. Therefore, the following 
data entries were omitted: firms with negative assets (for some reasons, these firms exist), 
firms with very little detailed structure of financial statements (determinants of the debt 
maturity structure could not be computed), years with double data entries (some firms were 
reported more than once for particular year, mainly with differing detailed structure of 
financial statements), firms of unknown business sector, and some other inconsistent data 
entries. 
This data set was further employed for the econometric analysis, which was computed in TSP 
software. 
3.5.  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependant and explanatory variables. The data 
set employed for the empirical evidence included balanced panel data of 793 firms, each firm 
was provided with financial statements for five years (2000-2004) making 3965 data entries in 
total.  
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10 Table 1:   Descriptive statistics for dependant and explanatory variables 
Descriptive statistics 
Valid 
N Mean  Std.  dev. 
Debt maturity structure3965  0,35  0,4407 
Growth options  3965  0,05  0,1858 
Firm size  3965  7,90  5,6554 
Collateralizable assets 3965  0,43  1,5038 
Leverage 3965  0,09  0,2011 
Asset maturity  3965  -0,04  0,4805 
Firm tax rate  3965  0,15  3,9974 
Firm level volatility  3965  6 987  328 820 
Table 2 reports the correlations matrix for the dependant and explanatory variables. The 
correlations are generally in line with the expectations of the regression model. The 
coefficients of correlation of explanatory variables are generally low. However, there are 
some exceptions of stronger correlations. First, Growth options strongly positively correlate 
with Collateralizable assets. Since tangible fixed assets are largely depreciated (only land is 
not depreciated) and also as there are few other assets than tangible fixed assets (as software) 
that are depreciated, the volume of depreciation is highly dependent on the volume of tangible 
fixed assets. Therefore these two explanatory variables correlate strongly. Second, Growth 
options also positively correlate with Leverage. This might be due to the fact that indebted 
firms have higher share of depreciated assets (mainly tangible fixed assets) and vice versa. 
Third, Growth options further negatively correlate with Asset maturity. Here the intuitive 
explanation does not seem to be at hand, as the Asset maturity is computed as an interaction 
of both fixed assets and equity levels. Fourth, Collateralizable assets positively correlate with 
Leverage, which is similar to the correlation of Growth options and Leverage. It might be the 
case that firms with higher share of tangible assets are more heavily indebted and vice versa. 
Fifth, Collateralizable assets are also negatively correlated with Asset maturity. Again, the 
explanation is not straightforward similarly to the case of the correlation of Growth options 
and Asset maturity. The only simple explanation would be that firms with tangible assets tend 
to have an excess of equity over fixed assets (and thus less need of long-term funds).  
 



















Growth options  1  0,0380,976  0,583  -0,466  0,001 -0,001  0,048 
Firm size  0,038  1  0,042  0,287  0,051  0,038 0,034  0,142 
Collateralizable assets 0,976  0,0421  0,598  -0,447  0,003 0,002  0,074 
Leverage 0,583  0,2870,598  1  -0,007  0,009  0,029  0,275 
Asset maturity  -0,466  0,051-0,447  -0,007  1  0,007 0,018  0,164 
Firm tax rate  0,001  0,0380,003  0,009  0,007  1  0,001  0,005 
Firm level volatility  -0,001  0,0340,002  0,029  0,018  0,001 1  0,008 
Debt maturity structure0,048  0,1420,074  0,275  0,164  0,005 0,008  1 
               
11 3.6.  Test of data set on macroeconomic environment 
Table 3 provides comparison of the Čekia data set used for our empirical analysis with data 
set of Czech statistical office (CZSO) as representative of general macroeconomic 
environment. Both portfolios are divided into industries according to NACE. However the 
CZSO portfolio includes only firms having more than 100 employees whereas the Čekia 
portfolio does not differentiate according to employees amount. Here small differentiation 
arises but still this is fully acceptable for the first approximation of the test of our data set with 
general macroeconomic environment. In general, the difference in the firms portfolio of Čekia 
and CZSO is not strong. The Čekia data set includes less manufacturing firms that are 
outweighed by more utilities and trading firms (wholesale, retail and others). This shows our 
data set is not to be biased from the general macroeconomic environment and the regression 
results can be considered as plausible.  
 
 
Table 3:   Data sets of CZSO and Čekia 
NACE  Industry name  Czech Statistical Office  Čekia 
A Agriculture,  hunting,  forestry  7,7%  5,3% 
01 Agriculture,  hunting,  forestry  and related activities  6,8% 4,4% 
02  Forestry and related activities  1,0% 0,9% 
B Fishing  0,1%  0,3% 
C Mining  0,9%  1,4% 
D Manufacturing  55,2%  38,1% 
DA  Manufacture of food, drink and tobacco products  7,0% 5,5% 
DB  Manufacture of textile and textile products  3,9% 2,5% 
DC  Manufacture of leather and leather products  0,7% 0,0% 
DD  Manufacture of wood products except for furniture  1,5% 0,8% 
DE  Manufacture of pulp and paper  2,3% 1,5% 
DF  Manufacture of oil and oil products  0,1% 0,4% 
DG  Manufacture of chemical and pharmaceutical products 1,9% 2,8% 
DH  Manufacture of rubber and rubber products  3,6% 1,8% 
DI  Manufacture of other non-metal mineral products  3,6% 3,7% 
DJ  Manufacture of basic metals and metal products  8,4% 4,9% 
DK Manufacture  of  machineries  8,1% 5,8% 
DL  Manufacture of electrical and optical devices  7,1% 2,9% 
DM  Manufacture of transportation vehicles  4,0% 4,0% 
DN  Manufacture of other products  3,1% 1,5% 
E Utilities  2,7%  10,6% 
F Construction  6,7%  7,9% 
G  Wholesale, retail and repair of conveyance and products
for personal use  10,5%  17,3% 
H Accommodation  1,8%  0,5% 
I Transportation  5,1%  5,4% 
K  Real estate activities  9,2%  13,2% 
12 3.7.  Regression results 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the model one and the model two. We list the results 
for two models separately, for both models we provide fixed effects and plain OLS results. 
However as we already mentioned the fixed effects model (and not the plain OLS model) is to 
be considered as appropriate for our data (as the theta is 0,153). Therefore the commentary of 
results shall mention only fixed effects and plain OLS remains for informational purposes 
only. The model one includes full list of explanatory variables listed in the hypotheses section 
to be considered. Model two does not include variables Firm tax rate and Firm level volatility, 
that were not found as statistically significant in model one for both fixed effects and plain 
OLS.  
The major explanatory variables have been found significant and more importantly also in 
line with the theoretical predictions (which are noted as an expected sign in the table). The 
Firm size has been found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the corporate 
debt maturity structure. Larger firms tend to have more long-term debt since they are said to 
have lower agency costs, better access to debtholders and stronger negotiation power. The 
Leverage has been found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the corporate 
debt maturity structure. More indebted firms tend to have more long-term debt and less 
indebted firms tend to have less long-term debt, which is a very intuitive result. The Asset 
maturity has been found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the corporate 
debt maturity structure. The firms have been found to conduct the maturity matching of their 
balance sheet following simple rule that fixed assets need to be funded by long-term funds 
(that is by the equity or by long-term debt). However remaining explanatory variables, namely 
Growth options, Collateralizable assets, Firm tax rate and Firm level volatility have not been 
found to have any statistically significant impact on the debt maturity structure. The Growth 
options and the Collateralizable assets have been found statistically significant in plain OLS 
computation, however this was not the case for the fixed effects approach. 
 
Table 4:   Regression results 
Model One  Model Two 
Explanatory variables 
Expected 








Growth  options  -  -0,175 -0,617 -0,175 -0,617 
     (-0,87)  (-3,51)*  (-0,87)  (-3,51)* 
Firm  size  +  0,037 0,012 0,036 0,012 
     (2,23)**  (3,03)*  (2,21)**  (-3,03)* 
Collateralizable assets  +  -0,648  0,039  -0,680  0,039 
     (-0,04)  (2,67)*  (-0,04)  (-2,67)* 
Leverage  +  0,425 0,066 0,424 0,655 
     (8,49)*  (14,46)*  (-8,46)*  (-14,46)* 
Asset  maturity  +  0,538 0,124 0,053 0,124 
     (2,32)**  (7,29)*  (-2,29)**  (7,29)* 
Firm tax rate  -  -0,110  0,049    
     (-0,86)  (-0,03)    
Firm level volatility  -  -0,213  -0,617    
     (-1,38)  (-0,31)    
Number of observations  3965 3965 3965 3965 
Adjusted R
2   0,6624 0,10989  0,6621 0,10986 
13 * significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, t-statistics in parenthesis 
In addition to these results, other findings can also be presented at this place. The Growth 
options proxied by equation (3) and equation (4) have delivered the same insignificant results. 
The Size proxied by equation (5) and equation (6) has delivered the same results. Both 
proxies have been found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the debt maturity 
structure. In our final models one and two we employed equation (6) as our proxy for Size. 
Collateralizable assets were insignificant for both equations, in final models equation (7) was 
used. 
The theoretical part also discusses the difference between equation (11) and (13) for proxying 
of Asset maturity variable. Our arguments in favor of equation (13) have been supported, as 
this variable has been found statistically significant with a positive impact on the corporate 
debt maturity structure; whereas the results of equation (11) were statistically at least mixed. 
It is necessary to mention, that these presented results are not only fully in line with the 
theoretical expectations and that they are also in line with other empirics (see below). But 
most importantly they are in line with intuitive expectations of finance practitioners. Despite 
the fact that there is no thorough analysis of financial managers’ opinions, they would 
probably name Firm leverage, Firm size, Firm’s collateral and Asset maturity as the major 
driving forces of the corporate debt maturity structure decision making. Nevertheless Firm’s 
collateral has been found as statistically significant for plain OLS only and not for fixed 
effects. 
3.8.  Comparative analysis 
Table 5 reports the comparison of selected empirical analyses on the corporate debt maturity 
structure. These papers employed varying proxies for particular determinants (both dependant 
and explanatory) generally discussed above in section on variables. Results of our analysis are 
fully in line with the results of other papers.  
A full consensus has been found in case of the explanatory variable Leverage and Asset 
maturity. Some consensus has been found in case of explanatory variables Firm size, 
Creditworthiness, Firm age, Liquidity, Firm level volatility, Interest rate term structure and 
Interest rate volatility. Whereas for the remaining explanatory variables Growth options, 
Collateralizable assets, Firm quality and Firm tax rate it has not been found any consensus.  
As the empirical findings for the Czech firms are generally in line with findings of other 
empirical analysis papers, which were generally focused on standard advanced economies 
such as Germany, UK or U.S.A., we can state that transition economy firms seem to have a 
similar pattern in the debt maturity structure decision making as the standard economies 
firms.  
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* FE is Fixed effects, CSR is Cross sectional regression, GMM is Generalized method of 
moments, OLS is Ordinary least squares. 
 
We need to mention to which extent these presented papers differ in their approach to the 
corporate debt maturity structure. In major cases, the plain OLS model is employed for the 
computations. The dependant variable is also employed in the form of equation (1). But this 
consensus cannot be found in explanatory variables.  
First, the amount of determinants differs throughout the papers. As some determinants are 
always used (Growth options, Firm size, and Asset maturity), there are also some 
determinants used very rarely (such as Firm age). The major factor driving these differences is 
the data availability. It would definitely be interesting always to investigate the impact of 
15 determinants such as Firm age or Creditworthiness, but as they are not easily accessible, we 
need to limit ourselves to fewer variables.  
Second, even if the same determinants have been employed, the proxies for such determinants 
can differ. Only in case of the determinant Firm size there is a general consensus with the 
equation (5). In case of other variables the proxies differ. Growth options are proxied either 
by the market value in equation (2) and its modifications or by the balance sheet structure in 
equations (3) or (4). Interestingly, there is no consensus in the findings. Some find the market 
value approach as statistically significant and some not, the same holds for the latter approach 
with the balance sheet structure. More interestingly, in case of Firm size, where has been 
found a consensus with proxy and significance, there was not found the consensus with the 
sign of impact. Some papers found statistically significant positive impact on the corporate 
debt maturity structure; other papers found an opposite effect. On the other side the impact of 
Asset maturity has been always found as statistically significant with a positive sign despite 
the fact that the particular proxies vary.  
4.  Portfolio analysis 
In this section we will focus on the portfolio analysis of the firms of the sample in order to 
bring some additional information to the regression results. First, the structure of the debt 
shall be considered, second the interaction of the debt and maturity matching principle shall 
be investigated. In both cases, we will consider the years 2000 and 2004 as the border times of 
our sample. Please notice that the same balanced sample of firms as in regression section is 
used. 
Graph 1 provides a comparison of firms and their utilization of debt financing in the firm 
sample. This is measured as a ratio of the particular group of firms to the total volume of 
firms in the sample. Slightly below a half of the firms do not utilize any debt (the bank debt, 
the intra-group debt or other debts) and this ratio did not change much between 2000 and 
2004. The pattern changed for the firms utilizing debt since the ratio of firms utilizing only a 
short-term debt (noted as the firms with a debt but without LT debt) has increased and on the 
contrary the ratio of firms utilizing both short-term and long-term debt has diminished. This is 
in line with findings of graph 2 where the ratio of long-term debt to the total debt has 
decreased.  
 












firms with debt but without LT debt
firms with LT debt
 
Graph 2 provides a comparison of the total debt in terms of relative importance of the short-
term and long-term debt. This is measured as a ratio of the volume of particular debt to the 
volume of the total debt for all firms in our sample. As can be seen the ratio of the short debt 
to the total debt has slightly increased between years 2000 and 2004 for our sample firms.  













Graph 3 provides a comparison of the total debt in terms of the debtholder’s counterparties. 
This is measured as a ratio of the volume of a particular debt to the volume of the total debt 
for all firms in our sample. The sample firms show an typical pattern of the bank-based 
financial system since bond financing is a secondary financing tool. Interestingly, the ratio of 
the bank financing to the total debt decreased to its half and has been replaced by other non-
bank debts and intra-group debts. An intra-group debt is usually in a form of short-term 
financing (also in a form of a trade credit) serving to the funding of working capital needs 
(and thus replacing the necessity of short-term bank loans) or in a form of long-term financing 
serving to the funding of investment activities (such as a transfer of production capacities 
from countries with higher production costs). These loans are often on an at-sight basis 
despite the fact whether they are utilized for short-term or long-term financing. The financing 
counterparties for intra-group loans are usually the parent firms, the sister firms, the cousin 
firms or even the intra-group financial institutions (the Group banks).  
 




















Graph 4 provides a comparison of the structure of a short-term debt in terms of the debtholder 
counterparties. This is measured as a ratio of the volume of a particular debt to the volume of 
the total debt for all firms in our sample. As can be seen, the importance of bank short-term 
funding has sharply decreased between 2000 and 2004 in favor of increased intra-group and 
other non-bank funding. The switch from bank funding to non-bank funding (loans from non-
bank institutions such as third parties in form of private individuals) is surprising and does not 
17 correspond to other indicators for financial sector, therefore it should be accounted to large 
extent to the accounting inaccuracy. 
 



















Graph 5 provides a comparison of the structure of a long-term debt in terms of the debtholder 
counterparties. This is measured as a ratio of the volume of a particular debt to the volume of 
the total debt for all firms in our sample. Similarly to the short-term debt structure, the pattern 
of the structure of a long-term financing slightly changed in followed firms sample. First, the 
ratio of the bank funds has decreased but still remains the major source of funds. Second, the 
ratio of the intra-group funds has significantly increased. Third, despite the fact that the 
amount of firms funded by bonds is very limited (below 5% of total firms in the sample) and 
even decreased between 2000 and 2004, the ratio of the long-term funds in the form of bonds 
has increased. This shows that the typical amount of a bond issue is much higher than the 
amount of other debt types issues. Please note, that as the accounting procedures in 2000 did 
not enable to distinguish CPLTD
20 for bonds, we included the CPLTD and the LPLTD
21 in 
long-term debts for all years. 
                                                           
20 CPLTD – current portion of long-term debt 
21 LPLTD – long-term portion of long-term debt 
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Graph 6 provides a comparison of the firm’s balance sheet structure according to the maturity 
matching principle. Based on this approach the fixed assets (FA) need to be funded either by 
the equity (Eq) and/or by long-term debts (LT debt). This is measured as a ratio of the 
particular group of firms to the total volume of firms in the sample. As can be seen, about 
29% of the firms in 2004 had fixed assets higher than the sum of equity and long-term funds 
and thus did not meet the maturity matching principle. As this is a lower ratio than in 2000 we 
can state that firms from our sample became wiser and conducted the liquidity immunization 
of the balance sheet structure more actively. Knowing that firms, which do not meet the 
maturity principle, are candidates for a financial distress in the long-term perspective, this 
development can be considered as a very satisfactory fact for the stability of the sample firms 
(and naturally for the economy as a whole). 
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Graph 7 provides a comparison of more detailed distinction of the balance sheet structure 
according to the maturity matching principle. This is measured as a ratio of the particular 
group of firms to the total volume of firms in the sample. In the graph above we have seen 
that the maturity matching principle has become more utilized by the firms in the sample. 
Going more into detail, we can state, that firms not meeting the maturity matching principles 
can be categorized into three groups. In the first group there are firms without any debt where 
the equity (Eq) is not strong enough to fund the fixed assets (FA). In the second group there 
19 are firms having only short-term debt where the equity is not strong enough to fund the fixed 
assets. In the third group there are firms having both a short-term and long-term debt but 
again the sum of the equity and long-term debt do not fully fund the fixed assets. As can be 
seen in graph 7 the maturity matching principle has been present more often in all groups of 
firms (without debt, with ST debt only, with both ST and LT debt) and the ratio of firms not 
immunizing the balance sheet structure has decreased for all three mentioned categories. 
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5.  Limitations 
Naturally, there are several areas of limitations of the presented empirical analysis. At this 
place we try to discuss at least three most important ones, namely the limited explanatory 
power of the data, the limited explanatory power of the variables, and the limited explanatory 
power of the determinants. 
Data limitations 
We need to be aware of the fact that the data employed for the empirical analysis (mainly 
financial ratios) have some limitations in evidence they provide. These mainly stem from the 
fact they are fully based on the accounting data. First, the majority of the financial statements 
is going through the process of window dressing in order to look better for shareholders and 
debtholders or in order to look worse for the tax authorities (depending on which incentive 
prevails). The discussion of this issue with endless list of names such as the window dressing, 
the book cooking or the creative accounting is not the subject of this paper. For us it is fully 
sufficient to state that financial statements can be ’cooked’ in all items (assets, liabilities, 
revenues and costs) in all directions (changing statement structure, increasing or decreasing 
20 some items or even swapping B/S and off-B/S status
22) and that this all can be done using 
both legal and illegal tools.  
Second, this collected data (still having in mind the book keeping limitations, the data 
structure, and data inconsistency adjustments mentioned in the data description paragraph) 
still reports some drawbacks. Surprisingly, the data does not fully meet the ex-ante expected 
range. There are firms with negative assets, a negative equity or even negative liabilities. 
These are states that should not be possible ex-definitione, but which are present and of which 
explanation is fairly simple (some firms book receivables as negative liabilities, some firms 
do not proceed according to bankruptcy law if having negative equity etc).  
To sum up the data limitations, although the accounting entries are called hard data, we know 
that they need to be interpreted with some degrees of freedom. But despite all these facts 
(majority of them shall be understood as data drawbacks), we must be aware of the fact, that 
this data is the best available one and therefore it brings some value added.  
Until now we have discussed the limitations of information that was included in the data. But 
we are also facing some limitations, which stem from the fact that our data does not include 
some useful information. First and most importantly we lack of information on market values. 
As the Czech corporate governance system is based on bank financing, the Czech capital 
market is very limited and therefore only a very limited amount of firms can report the market 
values for their equities. Thus we cannot investigate the impacts of the market value data on 
the debt maturity structure, which is usually employed for economies with a market based 
financing corporate governance system. This is especially missing in case of growth options 
assessments.  
Secondly we lack of information on credit ratings. Some studies on the debt maturity structure 
also employ credit ratings (Stohs and Mauer, 1996) or some default measures (Scherr and 
Hulburt, 2001; Heyman et al., 2003) as proxies for the corporate quality as one of the 
determinant of the corporate debt maturity structure. But in the Czech environment only a 
very limited amount of firms can report a credit rating of international rating agencies 
(Moody’s, Standard&Poor or Fitch), some of the firms can report credit rating of local rating 
agencies (CRA
23), but the majority of the reported firms remain unrated. Therefore we were 
not able to proxy the firm quality by credit ratings but the utilization of a default measure for 
the Czech evidence might be a subject of future research.  
Third, we lack of the flotation costs data, which is a very common fact for all economies as 
the transaction costs of a debt are very hard to assess. This would be useful information for 
purposes tackled in the tax hypothesis paragraph, but once again, as none of the empirical 
analyses on the corporate debt maturity structure include this proxy, this paper is not 
relatively worse in these terms. 
Fourth, we lack of the age of the firms. Naturally the Czech register of firms provides this 
type of information. But the nature of our data set where the firm names were not disclosed 
made it not possible to match the Čekia data and the Czech firms register data in order gain 
the firm’s age. This determinant would be definitely interesting to investigate. However as the 
firm’s age is not very often utilized in the debt maturity structure investigations, this paper is 
again not relatively worse in these terms. 
                                                           
22 B/S is balance sheet status, e.g. items booked on balance sheet, off-B/S is off-balance sheet 
status, e.g. items booked off-balance sheet. 
23 CRA – Czech Rating Agency, recently acquired by Moody’s 
21 Variables limitations 
But not only the data as such does have limitations. We employ this data for computations of 
variables, which serve as proxies for the determinants of the corporate debt maturity structure. 
As was already discussed in the empirical analysis section, setting the formula for a variable 
that shall serve as a proxy for a particular determinant is not always a simple issue. Firstly, 
some determinants do not have very explicit name. One can imagine Growth options, Firm 
quality, Creditworthiness or Firm level volatility in very differing states, therefore sometime 
the first task stems in the interpretation of the determinant name. Thus the variable formulas 
naturally differ across the empirical analysis papers even though there is a main stream of 
proxies created by papers inspired by each other. Secondly, even if there is a general 
consensus with the determinant name interpretation such as Collateralizable assets, we face 
differing formulas for the variables stemming from differing opinions on the items that should 
or should not be included into the formula. Thirdly, in some cases we can be provided with 
equally good proxies for one determinant as it seems to be the case for Firm size and we need 
to employ some decision making mechanism on choosing the more appropriate one. And last 
but not least, we have some variables, which might be employed as proxies for differing 
determinants. Here should be mentioned at least the complementarity of formulas proxying 
theories Signaling quality and Liquidity risk (for relevant literature see Table 5), however 
these were not investigated in this paper.  
Determinants limitations 
And finally, there are some limitations of determinants as such, namely in terms of the 
determinants coverage. In our analysis we employed those determinants that were found 
crucial by theoretical papers, those that were already utilized in empirical papers, and also 
those where the Czech data necessary for the computations is available. From the third reason 
we needed to omit Creditworthiness and Firm age, impact of which would be definitely 
interesting to assess. But we also face some other determinants that have not been utilized in 
empirical papers yet. First, no determinant takes into account some sort of cash flow. And as 
we know, that ’cash is king’ (McKinsey, 2005), the corporate debt maturity structure is to be 
expected being also affected by the fact whether a firm is cash rich or cash poor. In this term 
the proxies based on the EBITDA are to some extent close to the determinant of Cash flow, 
but one could imagine more precise proxy for such missing determinant. Second, we also 
miss an instrument that would incorporate the off-B/S
24 items important for the corporate debt 
maturity structure assessments. Leasing is the most important one. Despite some tax impact 
motivations there are mainly motivations in making the firm less indebted on on-B/S level 
that drives the utilization of leasing financing. And as the leasing as a sort of a long-term debt 
is not included in our computations, this makes our on-B/S long-term debt undervalued.  
And there is one more thing that we miss. The determinants of the corporate debt maturity 
structure are employed equally in the empirical analysis. But there is no reason to believe that 
in reality they have the same importance. It would be interesting to investigate, which 
determinant is more important than the other one, when this is the case, and why. As this is 
not possible to achieve by our model, this might be a subject of future research. 
To sum up this section, we have data that does not fully represent the variable formulas, we 
have variables (or proxies) that do not fully represent the determinants and we have 
determinants that need not to be necessarily the important ones for the corporate debt maturity 
                                                           
24 off-B/S are off-balance-sheet items 
22 structure. But despite all this the results are strong enough to improve our knowledge of true 
behavior of the firms in the debt maturity decision-making. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper was assembled in search of the determinants of the corporate debt maturity 
structure of Czech firms. In the theoretical section it has brought an overview of the points of 
departure for choosing the proper and important determinants for the corporate debt maturity 
structure. In the regression section it has shown, that a long-term debt increases with Firm 
size, Leverage and Asset maturity. The impact of Growth options, Collateralizable assets, 
Firm tax rate, and Firm level volatility has been found out as statistically insignificant. It was 
further shown that these results are generally in line with other papers on this topic covering 
other economies. In the portfolio analysis section this paper pointed out the bank-based 
system pattern of financing of Czech firms, increasing importance of intra-group financing 
and an increasing presence of the Maturity matching principle. Finally, the paper discussed 
the limitations of the results in the data, variables, and determinants field.  
The paper has shown that Czech firms, as representatives of transition economies, follow 
similar pattern in the setting of the maturity of a debt as it is the case of standard advanced 
economies. It has also delivered a list of arguments for different definition of two generally 
used proxies for the determinants of the debt maturity, namely Collateralizable assets and 
Asset maturity. 
In the introduction we promised to provide an additional stone into the mosaic of the 
empirical evidence on financing of Czech firms. The stone of the determinants of the debt 
maturity structure has been added, but the mosaic is not completely filled and there are still 
fields left for future research. As the CFO opinion survey of Dvořák (2004) was conducted in 
June 2000 we would appreciate a more recent in-depth view into the sentiments of financial 
decision makers. And as the Czech bankruptcy law is continuously changing, there is 
continuous need for evidence of financial distress of Czech firms. 
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